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Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-
pay auctions. We demonstrate that the first and second-price winner-pay auctions generate 
higher revenue than first-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. To 
prove it, we consider a framework with complete information. This analysis is relevant for 
two main reasons. On the one hand, complete information is more realistic and corresponds to 
events which occur for instance in a local service club (like in a voluntary organization) or in 
a show business dinner. Potential bidders are acquaintances or know one another well. On the 
other hand, our model keeps the qualitative predictions of a private value model under 
incomplete information in which bidders are ex ante asymmetric, which means that bidders’ 
values are drawn from different distributions. Furthermore, we also analyze second-price all-
pay auction. Finally, we show that individual minimum bids could improve the relative 
revenue performance of first-price all-pay compared to first-price winner-pay auction. 
JEL Code: D44, D62, D64. 
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More and more voluntary organizations wish to raise money for charity purposes through a
partnership with ﬁrms. Charity auctions have been held in the United States for many years
now. However, in China this phenomenon has emerged recently and is in strong progress.1 In
this kind of auction, an object (for example a key case with a zero value or an item given by
a luxury brand) is sold. The proceeds then go to charity. Most of these auctions are planned
and organized in charity dinners where only wealthy or famous people can participate. Beyond
the item value, the valuations of potential bidders depend on their interest for this voluntary
organization (their altruism or philanthropy) and also show some kind of conformism “to be
seen as the most wealthy and generous”. For instance, in China’s traditional society, charity
auctions were not put forward. The participants preferred to keep a low proﬁle about their
bids. However, time has changed: the rich and famous now show their wealth through their
involvement in charity auctions. According to the Beijing Review:
With the development of society, more rich people are emerging. They have
their own lifestyle [...] Some day, behind the rich lifestyle, people will ﬁnd that
it is only by o ering their love and generosity that they can realize their true
class.
Thus, through charity auctions, potential bidders can build their position in their social class.
Everybody wishes, independently of the winner’s identity, to raise the highest revenue. Potential
bidders make a trade-o  between giving money for the fund-raising and keeping it for another
personal use. Contrary to non-charity auctions, here the amount paid is “never lost”. A wealthy
investor, who bought a Dior perfume for 60 000 yuans (about 6 000 euros or 7 700 dollars) –
with a reserve price of 20 000 yuans – recently said in the Beijing Review:
I would never buy perfume for this amount normally, but this time it is for
charity. I feel very happy.
In fact, the money raised will be used to ﬁnance a public good. Every participant of the charity
auction may take advantage of it, independently of the winner’s identity. More precisely, the
money raised by each potential bidder impacts the utility of all participants as they take ad-
vantage of an externality of the amount of the money raised for the public good or the charity
purpose.
Under complete information, these kinds of auctions can be compared to the work of Ettinger
(2002) who analyzed a general winner-pay auction framework with two kinds of externalities.2
One of them does not depend on the winner’s identity and can be applied to charity auctions
where only the winner pays. Moreover, he shows that there is no “revenue equivalence” with these
externalities. Maasland and Onderstal (2006) investigate winner-pay auctions with this kind of
linear externalities in an independent private signals model. Their paper can also be applied to
charity. They ﬁnd similar qualitative predictions as Ettinger (2002): the second-price winner-
pay auction can outperform3 the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction. In their recent paper, Goeree
et al. (2005) analyze charity auctions in the symmetric independent private values model. They
1For example, in 2004, at the Formula One Grand Prix opening dinner party in Shanghai (China), an auction
was held of racing suits and crash helmets used by famous racing drivers (Beijing Review, 2005).
2To the best of our knowledge, Ettinger (2002) is the only one to consider general externalities which could
be non-linear.
3In the following, outperform means generate higher revenue.
2show that, given the externality, all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay
auctions (second-price outperforms ﬁrst-price) and lotteries. In particular, they determine that
the optimal fund-raising mechanism is given by the lowest-price all-pay auction with an entry
fee and a reserve price. Engers and McManus (2007) also ﬁnd closely results to Goeree et al.
(2005).4 Contrary to Goeree et al. (2005), a psychological e ect comes into play: the winner
beneﬁts from a higher externality with his own bid, the others’ bids having a lower e ect on
him. In their setting, as in Goeree et al. (2005), ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions and second-price
winner-pay auctions are better to raise money than ﬁrst-price winner-pay auctions. Moreover,
ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions outperform each winner-pay auction only for a su ciently high num-
ber of bidders. Additionally, Engers and McManus (2007) show that there are many optimal
charity auctions, among them for example a ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction with the suitable fees
and cancelling threat.
The predictions of Goeree et al. (2005) and Engers and McManus (2007) have been tested
experimentally with contradictory results. Onderstal and Schram (2008) have experimented the
Goeree et al. (2005)’s result in a laboratory. They are the ﬁrst to conduct a lab experiment for
charity auctions in an independent private value setting. Their results are close to the theoret-
ical predictions: in charity auction, ﬁrst-price all-pay auction raises higher revenues than other
mechanisms (ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction and lotteries). Carpenter et al. (2008) have tested
the predictions of Engers and McManus (2007) and Goeree et al. (2005) in a ﬁeld experiment.
Similar objects are sold in four American pre-schools through three di erent mechanisms which
are ﬁrst-price all-pay auction, ﬁrst-price and second-price winner-pay auctions. They study the
determinants of the bidders’ behavior and the revenue raised. Contrary to the theoretical predic-
tions, ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions do not produce higher revenues than the winner-pay auctions.
Therefore, if auction theory about charity is conﬁrmed in the laboratory, it is not the case in
the ﬁeld. The main explanation for the gap between theory and ﬁeld experiment can be a non-
participation e ect, due to the unfamiliarity with these mechanisms and their complexity: the
participants didn’t know the all-pay design and few took part in second-price auctions on the
Internet.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not all-pay auctions can raise higher
revenue for charity than winner-pay auctions when the asymmetry between bidders is strong.
We consider a complete information framework. As we said before, a lot of charity auctions are
conducted among rich people during charity dinners. These events could occur in a local service
club (like the Rotary club5 or another type of voluntary organization) or during a show business
dinner. Potential bidders are acquaintances or know one another well. Consequently, a complete
information environment is well suited for these kinds of situation. Thus, the paper of Goeree
et al. (2005) is revisited with asymmetric bidders in a complete information framework. Our
model keeps the qualitative predictions of a private value model under incomplete information
in which bidders are ex ante asymmetric, which means that bidders’ values are drawn from
di erent distributions.
4Besides, Engers and McManus (2007) also introduce fees and reserve prices. Then distinguish the issues
where the auctioneer can or cannot threaten to cancel the auction, which change their results.
5The Rotary club is a worldwide organization of business and professional leaders that provides humanitarian
services, encourages high ethical standards in all vocations, and helps build goodwill and peace in the world. There
are about 32 000 clubs in 200 countries and geographical areas and 1,000 clubs in France like Paris, but also in
small town like Niort. http://www.rotary.org/
3Following the work of Vartiainen (2007), we analyze all-pay auctions for charity as a mecha-
nism. This approach relies on a general model which can be applied to both ﬁrst and second-price
all-pay auctions. In our setting, every bidder takes as much advantage of his own bid as of her
rival’s bid thanks to the externalities. Additionally, we deﬁned the bidder i’s adjusted-value as
the ratio of her value for the item sold and the fraction of her payment which she perceives as a
cost given her altruism for the charity purpose. Then, we arrange bidders such as adjusted-values
and the valuations are ranked in the same order. We discuss this ranking and its consequences.
First-price all-pay auction equilibrium is characterized and the expected revenue computed;
but there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As in a case without externality, only the two
bidders with the highest adjusted-values are active. In order to raise money for charity, we
set up an optimal lobbying policy based on two steps. We also show the existence of a Nash
equilibrium with non-linear externality.
The equilibrium is also characterized and the expected revenue computed for the second-
price all-pay auction. In that case, the pure strategy Nash equilibria are degenerated. That is
why we determine the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We discuss our results by comparing
them to Ettinger (2002) who analyzes winner-pay auctions with externalities that do not depend
on the identity of the winner and which could be applied to charity auctions.
The second-price all-pay auction can raise more money than other auction designs as long
as the bidder with the highest adjusted-value takes part in the auction. Moreover, the revenue
of the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction can be dominated by the winner-pay auctions contrary to the
results of Goeree et al. (2005). Indeed, above a certain threshold of asymmetry in the bidders’
valuations, winner-pay auctions raise more money for charity than the ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions.
We can also revisit this result by an analysis of the bidders’ altruism.
In the last section, we evaluate the impact of individual minimum bids on ﬁrst-price all-pay
and ﬁrst-price winner-pay auctions. We assume the auctioneer knows the bidders’ valuations.
This assumption is relevant in a charity dinner which takes place in an isolated environment or
in a local service club. The auctioneer gets information through the board of directors of the
service club as he does not belong to this environment. Minimal bids could improve the relative
revenue performance of the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction compared to winner-pay auctions. Indeed,
minimal bids can o set the e ects of asymmetry in the bidders’ valuations.
2 The model
Following the work of Vartiainen (2007) with linear cost functions, we analyze all-pay auctions
for charity as a mechanism. This approach relies on a general model which can be applied to
both ﬁrst and second-price all-pay auctions. Yet, our approach is di erent. Moreover, in our
case, every bidder takes as much advantage of her own bid as of her rival’s bid thanks to intro-
duction of the externalities.
In a charity dinner, an indivisible object (or prize) is sold through an all-pay auction. This
prize is allocated to one of the potential bidders N = {1,...,n} contingents upon their bids
x = (x1,...,xn)   Rn
+. As the bidders usually meet each other in these kinds of events, the
willingness to pay and the valuation ranking of each bidder, v1 > v2 > ... > vn, are common
knowledge. An all-pay auction is a pairwise (a,t), a being the allocation rule and t the payment
rule.
4Allocation Rule. The allocation rule a = (a1,...,an) : Rn
+    [0,1]n is such that the winner
i gets the object if and only if ai(x) = 1 given the bids and
 n
i=1 ai(x) = 1 for all x. The object
is allocated to the highest bidder such that
 
ai(x) = 1
#Q(x) if i   Q(x)
ai(x) = 0 otherwise
where Q(x) := {j|j = argmax{xk,k   N}} is the collection of the highest bids.
Payment Rule. The payment rule t = (t1,...,tn) : Rn
+    Rn
+ represents for each bidder
i her transfer ti(x) to the charity organization for the vector of bids x. This payment rule is
contingent upon the all-pay design. In fact, in a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction, each bidder pays her
own bid
ti(x) = xi  i   N
while in the second-price all-pay auction the winner pays the second highest bid and the losers
their own bid
ti(x) = x(2) if i   Q(x)
ti(x) = xi otherwise
with x(2) the second order statistic of the sample (x1,...,xn).
The bidders wish to raise the maximum of money for charity. Every bidder takes advantage
of her own participation in the charity auction and of the others’ participations as well. In other
words, the money raised by each potential bidder impacts the utility of all of the participants
including herself. Thus, the bidder’s utility function includes an externality which depends on
the amount of money raised for the public good or the charity purpose. Denote hi(t(x)) the
externality that the bidder i takes advantage of.6 We could also consider the externality as a
function with only one argument
n  
j=1
tj(x). Indeed, the externality is independent of the winner’s
identity and only takes into account the amount raised. Like Goeree et al. (2005) and other













where  i   0 is the coe cient of the bidder i’s altruism for the charity purpose. Thus, the
bidder i’s utility is given by




Assumption 1 (A1). ˜ Ui(ai,t) is a continuous and di erentiable function in the transfer func-
tions tj for all j.
Thus, hi(t(x)) is continuous and di erentiable in all of its arguments.
Assumption 2 (A2).  xi   0
  ˜ Ui
 ti(x)






6The vectors (t1(y),...,tn(y)) and (t1(z),...,tn(z)) are denoted t(y) and t(z).
5This assumption reminds that the bidder has a strict preference to keep one euro for her
own use rather than to give it to the charity auction. This is the limit to the bidders’ altruism
to give money for charity.7 The limit of the bidders’ altruism is a ected by the payment rule.
Indeed, the bidder i’s transfer can be a function of her opponents’ bid. Thus, a change in the
payment rule leads to a new limit of the bidders’ altruism: in ﬁrst-price it is  i < 1 while in
second-price  i < 1/2.
Denote Fi(x)   P(Xi   x) the cumulative distribution functions such as the bidder i decides to
take a bid inferior to x. We denote Fi(0) the probability that bidder i bids 0. When Fi(0)  = 0,
bidder i bids zero with a strictly positive probability. When Fi(0) = 1, bidder i always bids zero
which means that she does not participate to the auction. F1,...,Fn can be interpreted as the






































with X i = (X1,...,Xi 1,Xi+1,...,Xn). To go from (1) to (2) we can notice that {#Q(x) = 1}
and {#Q(x) > 1} are disjoints. Thus, when #Q(x) > 1 the value of the integral is zero. Indeed,
a tie is a zero measure event.
Let us denote vi
1  i the bidder i’s adjusted-value. The bidders i’s adjusted-value is deﬁned
as the ratio of her value for the item sold and the fraction of her payment which she perceives
as a cost given her altruism for the charity purpose. We can observe this adjusted-value in
the expected utility with a normalisation by dividing it by 1    i. As bidders are ex ante
asymmetric, we arrange bidders such that vi
1  i decreases with the su x i and without equality.
This is common knowledge. Thus,
v1
1    1
>
v2
1    2
> ... >
vn
1    n
3 First-Price All-Pay Auction
In this section, we study the most popular all-pay auction design, i.e. the ﬁrst-price all-pay
auction. Every bidder pays her own bid, but only the one with the highest bid wins the object.
Given assumption A2, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This is a well known
result when there is no externality. We only give a sketch proof of this result with two bidders






= 1 then the bidder is indi erent between giving one euro for charity or investing it in an
another activity.
6Let us assume that xi   xj and consider some general externality (not necessarily linear) given
by hi(xi,xj). In such a framework, two cases can occur. First, if bidder j can overbid, then
her best reply is xi +  , for   > 0 such that vj   (xi +  ) + hj(xi,xi +  )    xj + hj(xi,xj).
Hence, it is impossible that xi   xj. Second, if j cannot overbid, then his best reply consists
in o ering zero since, given assumption A2, hj(xi,0) >  xj + hj(xi,xj). Consequently, i’s best
reply is to o er   > 0. As a result, the equilibrium is unstable and there is no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Linear Externalities
As we noticed in the last section, assumption A2 implies that  i < 1. If bidder i o ers xi, then j
will o er less with probability Fj(xi) and will o er more with probability 1  Fj(xi). Whatever
the outcome, bidder i beneﬁts from the sum of all bids, including her. We call an externality
the amount that bidder i beneﬁts from one bid. When computing her expected utility, she takes
the amount payed by each opponent into account. Bidder i’s expected utility with n potential








A potential bidder takes part in the auction if for some bids her expected utility is equal to or
higher than the externalities she enjoys when her bid is zero. Formally, a bidder takes part in
the auction if






j =i EXj bidder i’s expected reservation utility when she takes part in the auction.
We call the highest price at which a given bidder is ready to take part in the auction her
indi erence pricing. i’s indi erence pricing is noted ˜ xi and satisﬁes EUi(˜ xi) =  i
 
j =i EXj.
Proposition 1. There is a unique Nash equilibrium and the mixed strategies are given by
F1(x) =
1    2
v2




1    2
 
and F2(x) = 1  
1    1




1    1
v1




1    2
 
All other bidders use the pure strategy of zero and do not take part in the auction: Fj(0) = 1 for




1    2
 
1    1






Proof. See in Appendix.
At the Nash equilibrium, only two bidders are active: these bidders have the two high-
est adjusted-values. i’s indi erence pricing deﬁnes her adjusted-value and the second highest
adjusted-value speciﬁes the bidders’ maximum bid. Hence, the bidders’ mixed strategies are
represented by uniform distributions and are supported on [0, v2
1  2] given that bidder 2 (the
bidder with the second highest adjusted-value) takes part in the auction with probability
1   F2(0) =
1    1
1    2
v2
v1
Corollary 1. All bidders obtain a positive payo . Indeed, the bidders with the two highest
adjusted-value obtain a positive payo  U 
1 = v1   1  1













and their competitors get U 








1  2 + 1
 
for i   {3,...,n}.
7Proof. Computations.  
Contrary to the case with no externality, the opponents of the highest bidder get a positive
payo . That is a consequence of externalities: bidders take an advantage of the competitors’
behavior.
Remark 1. Let us assume the di erence between  1 and  2 is high enough for bidder 1’s
adjusted-value to be ranked second such that the two highest adjusted-values would be permuted.
Then bidder 1 can get a lower payo  than in the case with no externality if and only if her
altruism level is lower than ˜     2 v1 v2
3v1 2v2. We notice that this threshold does not depend on her
rival’s altruism level, while the changes in the ranking of the adjusted-values is only due to the
di erence between the players’ altruism levels.
We can notice here that there are two opposite e ects. Because of the externalities, the
value of one euro that is invested in the auction is less than one euro. Thus, it is possible that
the bidders choose more aggressive o ers. However, every bidder knows that her competitor is
more agressive and that this will a ect one’s probability of winning. Given an increasing of her
competitor’s aggressiveness, the bidder’s best reply can be increasing or decreasing.
Example 1. Let us consider two bidders with external e ects  1 =  2 = 1
2min ˜ xi with ˜ xi = xi
1  i.






et ˜ x2 = v2 + 1
2.


















The bidders’ payo s are U 
1 = v1   v2 + 1
2
v2
v1 and U 
2 = 1
4
In order to raise money for charity, we set up an optimal lobbying policy based on two steps.
The ﬁrst step consists in making the low8 bidder aware of the charity auction and increases her
adjusted-value. It is well known reducing the asymmetry that exists between bidders tends to
increase competition, and thus leads to a higher rent for the auction. Once the updated-value
of the low bidder is equal to the adjusted-value of the high bidder, the second step is to make
both agents sensitive to the auction so as to keep their adjusted-values equal. It is important
not to work only on the sensitiveness of the bidder with the highest valuation in order to avoid
disastrous consequences in terms of revenue.




for x   [0,v]. Finally, the optimal level of altruism ( 1, 2) that gives the maximum
revenue for the auction is given by  2 = 1  
v2
v1
(1    1).
Thus, as opposed to Baye et al. (1993), in charity auctions it is not conceivable to exclude
bidders with higher values.
3.2 Non-Linear Externalities
We extend our result to non-linear externalities. We consider two bidders only, such that the
expected utility is given by,
EU1(x1,X2) = F2(x1)(v1 + EX2(h1(x1,X2)\X2   x1)   x1) + (1   F2(x1))(EX2(h1(x1,X2)\X2   x1)   x1)
EU2(x2,X1) = F1(x2)(v2 + EX1(h2(X1,x2)\X1   x2)   x2) + (1   F1(x2))(EX1(h2(X1,x2)\X1   x2)   x2)
8The low and high bidders are respectively the active bidders with the second and the ﬁrst highest adjusted-
values.






It can also be written as
 
EU1(x1,X2) = F2(x1)v1   x1 + EX2h1(x1,X2)
EU2(x2,X1) = F1(x2)v2   x2 + EX1h2(X1,x2)
Bidder i takes part in the auction if her expected utility is higher than her reservation utility:
  xi such that EUi(xi,Xj)   EXjhi(0,Xj)
Proposition 2. Given assumptions A1   A2 and that the two bidders have a common support
[0,b], the mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
Proof. See in Appendix.  
The expected utility’s derivative is a Fredholm equation of the second type. The existence
of a solution depends on a condition made on the kernel (the kernel being the externality here).
Nonetheless, given that the solution is a distribution function deﬁned on a closed and convex
set of continuous distribution functions, we are able to show its existence by using the second
Schauder’s theorem without this standard condition. The solution seems to be unique only in
very speciﬁc cases, as said in the literature about Fredholm equations.9
4 Second-Price All-Pay Auction
In a second-price all-pay auction, the payment rule is the following: the winner pays the second
highest bid and others pay their own bid. Our purpose is now to determine bidders’ strategies
and revenues. In the next section, we will compare the rents obtained in ﬁrst-price and second-
price auctions, as well as winner-pay and all-pay auctions. As a result, we will know which of
these designs is the best to raise money for charity.
It is not necessary to ﬁnd each agent’s probability distribution’s support in order to deter-
mine the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Actually, we only need to assume that each bidder
i’s o er, xi belongs to a strategy space Xi   [0,+ ). For the same reasons as in the ﬁrst-price
auction, the bidders’ minimum valuations is zero. As noticed before, assumption A2 allows us
to write that  i < 1/2.
As for now, we have exclusively studied mixed strategy equilibria. Yet, there are also pure
strategy Nash equilibria. Note that these equilibria are degenerated as in the situations without
externalities. We give only an intuitive argument for the two bidder case. Bidder i’s expected
utility is given by
Ui(x) =
 
   
   
vi + (2 i   1)xj if xi > xj
vi
2
+ (2 i   1)xi if xi = xj
(2 i   1)xi if xi < xj
As before, we note ˜ xi bidder i’s indi erence price, such that ˜ x1 > ˜ x2. Let xi be bidder i’s o er.
There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria,
(0, 1) with  1   (˜ x1,+ )
( 2,0) with  2   (˜ x2,+ )
9Kanwal (1971) has written a very complete book about these questions while Ledder (1996) gives a simple
method and ﬁnds another condition to prove the solution’s uniqueness.
9The revenue earned for the auction is zero.
4.1 Two Bidders
The strategies’ supports are no mass points and are continuous. If two bidders have a mass
point, a deviation increases their probability to win. Furthermore, if one bidder has a mass
point, his rival will never choose an action below this point. Thus, this bidder’s mass point can




(vi   (1   2 i)x)dFj(x)   (1   2 i)xi(1   Fj(xi))
In the second-price all-pay auction with two bidders, the payment rule leads to t1(x) = t2(x).
Thus, when a bidder wins she pays his rival’s bid. Additionally, each bidder beneﬁts from two
externalities, one of which is associated to her own bid, and this other one of which is associated
to her rival’s bid.
Proposition 3. There is a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Bidder i’s strategy is given
by an exponential distribution deﬁned as follows,
Fi   E
 





1   2 1
+
v2
1   2 2
Proof. See in Appendix.  
4.2 n Bidders
It is more di cult to ﬁnd the equilibrium with n bidders. We note Gi(x) =
 
j =i Fj(x). It


































Fm(xi)(1   Fl(xi))
 
The transition from (2) to (3) is explained in the proof of the proposition 4 given in appendix.
The ﬁrst line’s two terms represent bidder i’s payo  condition to her winning or losing the
auction, given the externality that arises from her own action. The other lines represent the
externalities that come from her competitors’ actions (whether they lose or win).
The ﬁrst of those two lines describes the situation when bidder l (l  = i) loses the auction. In the
last line bidder l wins the auction; we distinguish situations where bidder i’s bid is the second
highest o er from situations in which it is not. Each bidder’s o er can be the second highest bid
and we hold account of it (sign sum under the integral). The bidder who makes an o er between
bidder i and bidder l’s o ers puts forward the second highest bid. The other part gives the
amount of money that bidder l will have to paid when i o ers the second highest bid. Indeed,  
m =i,l
Fm(xi)(1   Fl(xi)) is the probability that every bidder except l makes a lower bid than i .
This probability is multiplied by the sum o ered by the bidder i.
10Note that this expression of expected utility is not valid unless there are at least four bidders.
In order to study the three bidders case, it is necessary to (slightly) change the third line. To do
this, we must stop computations to the second line of term BI in the appendix. Thus, this term







xkdFk(xk)dFl(xl) + xiFk(xi)(1   Fl(xi))
 
, where k is not i, neither
l. We do not explain this calcul more.
Proposition 4.  i > 2 and suppose assumptions A1   A2 hold, only two bidders among n
participate actively to the auction.
Proof. See in Appendix  
The bidders’ mixed strategies are given by the proposition 3. The weakness of this result is
we do not know which bidders are going to participate. Thus, it could happen that the two
bidders with the highest values participate or the ones with the lowest values. There are some
consequences on the expected revenue.
5 Revenue Comparisons
In this section, we investigate the performance of the revenues and the expected revenues ob-
tained with the di erent designs.
We consider here that the two bidders have the same altruism level i.e.  1 =  2 =  . Hence,














1   2 
i,j   N
Indexes APi and WPi correspond to ist-price all-pay and winner-pay auctions. If bidders are
complete altruists, i.e.  AP1    1 and  AP2    1/2, the expected revenues diverge as Goeree
et al. (2005) predicted. Thus, the altruism level is an essential element to determine the expected
revenue. When bidders’ altruism levels are the same, the rent for the auction is at least equal
to the rent one would obtain with non-altruistic bidders.
In the following, we use Ettinger (2002)’s results about winner-pay auctions with externality
to compare the ones with our results about all-pay auctions with externality. These results are
sum up in this table:
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v1 + vi, i  = 1
Table 1: Revenues and expected revenues for every design
Let us consider homogeneous values. Then, we ﬁnd the same qualitative results as Goeree
et al. (2005) does. In particular, the second-price all-pay auctions rent dominates the ﬁrst-price
all-pay auctions rent which dominates the winner-pay auctions rent.
We can notice that the second-price all-pay auction gives a higher rent than other auction
designs as long as the bidder with the highest adjusted-value takes part in the auction. On
the contrary, when this bidder does not take part in the auction, the ranking of the expected
11revenue raised in the second-price all-pay auction depends on the asymmetry between bidders’
valuations. Moreover, if our setting is suited to charity dinners with complete information (for
example dinners organized by a local Rotary Club) ﬁrst-price all-pay auction contradicts Goeree
et al. (2005)’s qualitative results. In order to analyze the impact of asymmetry on rents, we use
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition. The level of asymmetry between bidders’ valuations will be considered “high” if
v1   v2 > 2 v1, “medium” if 2 v1 > v1   v2 > 2 v1   v1 + v2
v2
v1 and “low” if v1   v2 <
2 v1   v1 + v2
v2
v1.
Proposition 5. We assume that  i =    i and that the bidder with the highest value takes part
in the second-price all-pay auction. Then, this design gives the highest revenues:
ERAP2 > RWP2   RWP1 and ERAP2 > ERAP1
All other things being equal, ERAP1 > RWP2 if and only if the level of asymmetry between
valuations is “low”, RWP2 > ERAP1 > RWP1 if and only if this level is “medium”, and RWP1 >
ERAP1 if and only if it is “high”.
Proof. Computations.  
The second part of this proposition can be interpreted in two independent ways.
• First of all, given  , the (ﬁrst-price) all-pay auction is dominated by the ﬁrst-price winner-
pay auction when asymmetry is “high”. Furthermore, this all-pay auction raises more
money than the second-price winner-pay auction when asymmetry is “low”. Thus, in order
to determine which design is better to raise money for charity, we need to know the level
of asymmetry between bidders.
• Given v1 and v2, the (ﬁrst-price) all-pay auction is dominated by ﬁrst and second-price
winner-pay auctions when the bidders’ altruism level is less than 1
2(1   v2
v1). Moreover,
the all-pay auction outperforms the ﬁrst-price auction and is dominated by the second-




v1 + 1) and superior to
1
2(1  v2
v1). In particular, the threshold above which this all-pay auction raises more money
than the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction is less than 1
2. Finally, the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction





The more asymmetry increases, the more the level of the altruism must also increase for
the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction to give a higher rent than winner-pay auctions. The two graphs
below show the limits (in terms of rent domination) for the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction. We use
two parameters: altruism level and the asymmetry among bidders’ values (from left to right,
v2
v1
varies from 0.9 to its limit in zero with a 0.1 step).







Figure 1: ERAP1 > RWP2







Figure 2: ERAP1 > RWP1
As a consequence, in order to determine which design is better to raise money for charity
we need to know both the level of asymmetry and altruism. Contrary to the results of Goeree
et al. (2005), here the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction does not outperform the winner-pay auctions
every time.
6 Individual Reserve Price
In this section, we determine the impact of minimum bids imposed on rent for two auction
designs: ﬁrst-price all-pay and winner-pay auction.10 In the rest of the paper, we will note
ti(x) = xi for all i   N. Moreover, we analyze only the two bidders case (who have the highest
valuations). Indeed, only these two bidders participate in all-pay auction as in the third section.
The charity auction organizer imposes an individual bid on everybody: bidder i has to o er
a bid at least equal to tvi so as to take part in the auction. This implies that the auctioneer
also knows the bidders’ value, so that she can impose a rate t on them. This assumption is
not unrealistic. This phenomenon could occur in a local service club (like a local Rotary club)
or during a show business dinner. Indeed, the auctioneer could obtain this kind of information
through the sta  of the local community or because she is herself a member or a friend of the
participants.
As expected, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.11 In order to ﬁnd the strategies
and the probability of entry, we focus on the situation where every bidder wants to participate.
Lemma 1. At equilibrium, the bidders’ minimum bids are asymmetric. They are tv1 for bidder
1 and tv2 for bidder 2. In fact, the latter’s density is equal to zero on the support (tv2,tv1].
With probability one, bidder i’s o er will be at least equal to tvi. We conclude that minxi  
tvi. Now, let us assume that minx1 = x > tv1. Then P(X1 < {x}) = 0, because bidder 1 never
makes any o er in the interval (tv1,x). His competitor o ers either tv2 or x+  for   > 0, a bid
between these two values being strictly dominated. Then, if bidder 1 bids x     her probability
of winning is not a ected. Thus, his minimum bid is tv1. Moreover, bidding in the interval
(tv2,tv1] is strictly dominated for bidder 2. Hence, P(tv2 < X2   tv1) = 0 and if she bids
tv2 < x   tv1 he loses for sure. When she o ers x = tv2 she does not a ect his probability of
10We would have similar results with the second-price winner-pay auction instead of the ﬁrst-price. As the
latter is more used than the former for charity auctions, we investigate this one.
11To see this, let us assume that x1   x2. As before, we have to consider two situations. First, bidder 2 can
overbid. It contradicts the initial assumption. If she cannot overbid, given A2, her best reply is to o er tv2.
Hence, bidder 1 bids tv1. The equilibrium is unstable.
13winning but increases her payo  by A2. Furthermore, she increases her probability of winning
by bidding x = tv1 +   for   > 0. Bidder 2’s density function is zero on the interval (tv2;tv1].
Lemma 2. At equilibrium, bidders o er the same maximum bid ¯ x = (1    2t)˜ x2. Every bidder
has a mass point for his minimum bid and a mass point can never be on (tv1, ¯ x].
Even if the payo  functions are the same that the ones pointed out in section 3, that is to
say
EU1(x,X2) = F2(x)v1   (1    1)x +  1EX2, EU2(x,X1) = F1(x)v2   (1    2)x +  2EX1
the expected level of the bidders’ reservation utilities are changed. Indeed, as the minimum bids
are positive, bidder i’s reservation utility is  iEXj +  itvi: he participates to the auction if she
gets at least  iEXj (as before) plus the reward of her own minimum bid. Hence, the maximum
bid is equal to the lowest of the two bidders’ indi erence pricing. At her indi erence pricing,
bidder i is indi erent between taking part in the auction or not, that is to say to o er tvi. Thus,
the maximum bid is ¯ x = (1    2t)˜ x2.
Given the former analysis, bidder 2 has a mass point on tv2. Bidder 2’s strategy space is
{tv2}   (tv1; ¯ x]. For similar reasons as in section 3 and for the case without externality, having
a mass point on the bidders’ common strategy set is dominated for every bidder (since they
deviate).12
For now, we only consider the bidders’ common strategy set, that is to say (tv1; ¯ x]. A bidder’s
equilibrium payo  is a constant function on her whole strategy set.13 Hence,
F2(x)v1   (1    1)x +  1EX2 = v1   (1    1)¯ x +  1EX2 (4)
for all x   (tv1; ¯ x]. The left member of this equation is the bidder 1’s expected utility for all
bids in (tv1; ¯ x], while the right member is bidder 1’s payo  when he bids ¯ x. In the same way,
bidder 2’s bid is such that
F1(x)v2   (1    2)x +  2EX1 = v2   (1    2)¯ x +  2EX1 (5)
and thus belongs to the interval {tv2}   (tv1; ¯ x].
In particular, for all bids in the interval (tv1, ¯ x] and for  1 =  2, we ﬁnd that
v2(1   F1(x)) = v1(1   F2(x))
As bidder 2 has a mass point on tv2, the limit in tv1 gives us the following result14







Using (4) and (5), it is easy to determine the bidders’s distribution functions. We specify
them in proposition 6 below. As F2(tv1) is not equal to 1   v2
v1 (the value in zero without any
externality and minimum bids imposed) bidder 1 has indeed a mass point on tv1. The bidders’
distribution functions are drawn below.
12We give here a well-known argument (see for instance Che and Gale (1998)) to support this idea. If only
one bidder has a mass point on the support that is common to both bidders, her competitor’s density function
below this mass point is equal to zero. Hence, she is going to move and her mass point will be the support’s
lower bound. This action does not a ect his probability of winning, but it increases her payo  if she wins. In
a similar way, if bidders have a mass point, deviating increases their probability of winning. Consequently, the
result follows.
13In the following we use similar technical arguments than Che and Gale (1998).
14As P(tv2 < X2   tv1) = 0 it follows that lim
x tv1
F2(x) = F2(tv1) = F2(tv2).
14 
 









Figure 3: Cumulative distribution functions at the equilibrium
Proposition 6. Given the bidders’ adjusted-values, (1    1t)˜ x1 and (1    2t)˜ x2, there is a
unique Nash equilibrium. The bidders’ strategies for all x   (tv1; ¯ x] are
F1(x) =  2t +
x
˜ x2
and F2(x) = 1 +
x   ¯ x
˜ x1
.
Every bidder has one point mass: it is tv1 for bidder 1 and tv2 for bidder 2.
A bidder’s decision is given by her probability to participate,
1   F1(tv1) = 1    2t  
tv1
˜ x2
and 1   F2(tv2) =
¯ x   tv1
˜ x1
Additionally, if the maximum bid ¯ x is inferior to bidder 1’s minimum bid ¯ x   tv1, o ering a
higher bid than their minimum bid is dominated for all bidders. Hence, ER = t(v1 + v2) for all
t   ¯ t where ¯ t  
˜ x2
v1 +  2˜ x2
.
Here, we consider the case where 0   t < 1 only.15
Proposition 7. Given the distribution functions F1(.),F2(.) at equilibrium, the expected revenue





¯ x2 ˜ x1 + ˜ x2
2˜ x1˜ x2
+ (tv1)2 ˜ x1   ˜ x2
2˜ x1˜ x2
+ t2v1 2 + tv2
 
1 +
tv1   ¯ x
˜ x1
 
if t < ¯ t
t(v1 + v2) otherwise
15t > 1 is not appropriate here. Indeed, the minimum bid of one bidder could be higher than the maximum
bid.
15Proof. We only have to compute the expected revenue associated to every bidder when t < ¯ t:
ERi =




  ¯ x
tv1
fi(y)dy  





= ¯ x(Fi(¯ x)   Fi(tv1))  
  ¯ x
tv1
Fi(x)   Fi(tv1)dx + tviFi(tv1)
= ¯ x  
  ¯ x
tv1
Fi(x)dx + (tvi   tv1)Fi(tv1)
Hence, ER1 =
¯ x2 + (tv1)2
2˜ x2
+ t2v1 2 and ER2 =









We must analyze the impact of t on the rent. This will allow us to determine whether impos-
ing a minimal bid to every bidder permits to improve the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction’s e ciency
compared to the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction or not. In order to do so, we assume that bidders
have the same altruism attitude, such that   =  1 =  2. We analyze only the revenue achieve-
ment for t   ¯ t. After an increase in t, there are two contradictory e ects. The bidders’ support’s
lower bound increases while its upper bound decreases. As a consequence, the expected revenue
can increase or decrease. The result depends on which e ect dominates the other.
First of all, let us assume that the asymmetry between the bidders’ values is considered “high”
such that v1   v2 > 2 v1. As a consequence, the all-pay auction expected revenue is increasing
in t. The low altruism level of the bidders o sets the impact of t on the bidders’ maximum
bid, so that the e ect on the lower bound dominates.16 As was pointed out before, when t = 0
the all-pay auction expected revenue is strictly dominated by the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction
revenue.17 Given this result, the all-pay auction gives a higher revenue than the winner-pay
auction for a value of t that o sets the impacts of asymmetry. The graph below illustrates this
result for v1 = 20 and v2 = 5. Each curve is the expected revenue when asymmetry is considered
“high” and for a speciﬁc value of t. The lower envelope curve is given by t(v1+v2). The ﬁrst-price
winner-pay auction revenue is given by the dashed curve.






Figure 4: Expected revenue with a “high” asymmetry
16We saw in section 5 that v1   v2 > 2 v1 could also be interpreted as a low altruism level.
17The ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction gives a revenue v2 with a rate t inferior to
v2
v1 < ¯ t. For higher rates, the
revenue becomes tv1 < t(v1 + v2).
16It is obvious that situations where asymmetry is “medium” or “low” give the same result:
all-pay auction raises more money than winner-pay auction. Yet, it is interesting to draw the
expected revenues associated to those asymmetry levels. Here, the decreasing e ect of the
support’s upper bound is higher than the increasing e ect of the lower bound below a given
















Figure 6: ER for v1
v1+v2 >   > v1 v2
2v1
Proposition 8. Imposing a minimal bid to every bidder permits to improve the ﬁrst-price all-
pay auction’s e ciency compared to the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction. There is a threshold t
above which the all-pay auction dominates the winner-pay auction when the values’ asymmetry
is considered “high”.
Example 2. We focus again on the example 1: two bidders beneﬁt the same externality  1 =
 2 = 1
2min ˜ xi. Hence, the two bidders’ maximum bid is ¯ x = v2 + 1 t





and F2(x) = 1 +
v2(2x   2v2 + t   1)
v1(2v2 + 1)














tv1   v2  
1   t
2
  
The graphic below gives all the charts of expected revenue with t < ¯ t, v2 = 5 and v1 increasing
from 7 to 20 with a 0.5 step.18 Example 1 (without minimum bids imposed) is equivalent to
the situation when t = 0. Thus, when the values of t are high enough, we can notice that the
ﬁrst price all-pay auction is better than the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction with “high” level of
asymmetry.
18v1   7 ensures that the asymmetry between values is “high”.










This paper shows that all-pay auctions do not raise higher revenue for charity than winner-pay
auctions every time. Indeed, this result depends on the asymmetry between bidders. In partic-
ular, winner-pay auctions outperforms ﬁrst-price all-pay auction when the asymmetry between
bidders is strong. That contradicts Goeree et al. (2005)’s results. Our work can be related to
the one of Carpenter et al. (2008). Indeed, they have found in a ﬁeld experiment that ﬁrst-price
winner-pay auction outperforms ﬁrst-price all-pay auction. One of the explications could be a
strong asymmetry between bidders.
This work could be completed by a laboratory experiment. In fact, only one lab experiment
(Onderstal and Schram (2008)) has been implemented until now with opposite results to the
ﬁeld experiment of Carpenter et al. (2008). Onderstal and Schram (2008) ﬁnd similar results to
Goeree et al. (2005). However, our results are quite di erent from Goeree et al. (2005)’s because
of the introduction of asymmetric valuations. That is why, it would be interesting to test our
prediction with the introduction of asymmetry between the bidders’ valuations: all-pay auctions
can be dominated by winner-pay auctions. That could also be the occasion to test the impact
of altruism on agents’ behavior. Finally, theoritical and experimental works should be led about
the form of the externalities that we considered here linear.
All-pay auctions with externalities that are independent of the winner’s identity but func-
tions of the amount raised have other applications in economy.
Here, we focus on the team theory. This illustration could be connected to other forms of
team works (particularly in ﬁrms) leading to social promotion. Let’s consider, a team sport
like basket-ball. Every year during the American championship of basket-ball (the NBA) or
the all-stars game ﬁnals, the most valuable player (MVP) is elected. During such games, every
player makes the highest e ort to win the event but also to be elected the MVP of the game.
Each player takes advantage of the team’s e ort to win the game and thus can be elected MVP
thanks to the externality of the total amount of the e orts made. vi represents the player’s value
for the MVP title. Therefore, her e ort xi has two goals: to win the game and be elected MVP.
When a player is not elected MVP, he takes advantage of the externality by winning the game.
As a player tries to win the game by making the highest e ort, he helps also her team mates to
be elected MVP .
In a recent paper, Edlin (2005) displays a tax credit method to incite people to give more
for charity purposes. He suggests to deduce the agents’ donations to charity organizations from
18their income tax (limited to a certain percent of their income). The agents are free to choose the
organization they want to help. This method should improve the all-pay auctions performance
for charity and lets an open question for futur researches.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Let us consider the two bidder case. If we divide the bidders’ i expected
utility by 1    i, we almost obtain the same bidders’ expected utility as in the case without
externality given by Hillman and Riley (1989). However, after this operation has been made,
there remains an important di erence between the bidder’s expected utility we ﬁnd and the one
Hillman and Riley (1989) ﬁnd. Indeed, there is a constant in their function while our function
has an externality  j
EXj
1    i
. Thus, we only have a constant in our function at the equilibrium.
That makes an important di erence. By this division the result for the two bidder case follows
as in Hillman and Riley (1989). Yet, we cannot use the proof of Hillman and Riley (1989)
to determine the uniqueness when there are more than two bidders. Indeed, bidders take into
account the positive amount payed by each opponent. Thus, even if externalities are constant
at the equilibrium, bidders do not take advantage of the same positive externalities. Let us
assume that a third bidder takes part in the auction. Her expected utility is equal to or higher
than  3EX1 +  3EX2. Deﬁne ˜ xi = xi
1  i. Given her two rivals’ mixed strategies, it follows that
F1(x3)F2(x3)v3   (1  3)x3, which is equivalent to ˜ x1(˜ x3   ˜ x2)   ˜ x3(˜ x2  x3). As ˜ x2 > ˜ x3 and
˜ x3   x3, there is a contradiction. This result can be generalized to a game with n bidders. To
show that there is a unique solution, here we could apply the lemma 14’ of Baye et al. (1990):
˜ xi = 0  i > 2.19  
Proof of proposition 2. The sketch of this proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition
2 in Anderson et al. (1998). For similar reasons as the ones pointed out without externalities,
the two players make their bids on the common support [0,b] and the density function, F 
i = fi
exists. The set of equilibria in mixed strategies is completely characterized by a Nash equilibria
where only pure strategies which are better responses to the others strategies are played with a
strictly positive probability. All of these strategies lead to the same expected utility. Next, we
denote   = 1
vi and ignore the su x.
Let T be an operator such as T : F(x)     TF(x) and
TF(x)    x    
  b
0
h(x,y)f(y)dy + constant (6)
As F is a continuous function, we restrict our study to the set of continuous functions on [0,b]
denoted C[0,b]. Especially, we consider D = {F   C[0,b]\||F||   1} with ||.|| the supremum
norm. The set D, which includes all of the continuous distribution functions, is closed and convex
but not compact. Thus, to prove that (6) has a solution, we apply the following Schauder’s second
theorem:
Theorem (Schauder, 1930). If D is a closed convex subset of a normed space and E a relatively
compact subset of D, then every continuous mapping of D to E has a ﬁxed-point.
19Actually, the proof of this lemma has to be slightly changed and be adapted to our setting. As the modiﬁ-
cations are of minor importance, we do not give the details of the proof.
19To apply this theorem, we need to prove two parts. First, that T(D)   E = {TF\F   D}
is relatively compact.20 Second, T is a continuous mapping from D to E.
Showing that E is relatively compact is equivalent to showing that E is uniformly bounded
and equicontinuous (Ascoli’s theorem) on [0,b]. Generalization of the assumption A2 leads to
 h
 x(x,y) < 1 for all y   [0,b]. Then, TF(x) is nondecreasing. Thus |TF(x)|   TF(b) = 1, for
all x   [0,b]. Let us show that E is equicontinuous. We need to show that  ,  , F   E such
that |TF(x1)   TF(x2)| <   when |x1   x2| <  .
|TF(x1)   TF(x2)| =
   
    (x1   x2)    
  b
0
[h(x1,y)   h(x2,y)]f(y)dy
   
   
   
 
|x1   x2| +
   
   
  b
0
[h(x1,y)   h(x2,y)]f(y)dy
   
   
 
   |x1   x2|
 
1 +
|supy [0,b][h(x1,y)   h(x2,y)]|
|x1   x2|
 
<   
 
1 +
|supy [0,b][h(x1,y)   h(x2,y)]|
|x1   x2|
 
The function h is continuous and bounded on [0,b]. [0,b]is a compact which explains the result
of the last line. Denoted     |supy [0,b][h(x1,y)   h(x2,y)]|. Thus, |TF(x1)   TF(x2)| <   for
  =  
|x1 x2|
 (|x1 x2|+ ).
Now, let us prove the continuity of T. The operator T is continuous if, for all F1,F2 and for
all   > 0, there exists a   > 0 such that |TF1(x) TF2(x)| <   when |F1  F2| <  . Let us write
F1(x) = F2(x) + g(x) with    < g(x) <    x   [0,b]. Henceforth
|TF1(x)   TF2(x)| =
 
   
     
  b
0
h(x,y)(f1(y)   f2(y))dy
 
   
 








< h(b,b)  
To go from the ﬁrst to the second line, notice that F 
1(x)   F 
2(x) = g (x). We use the fact that
h is a continuous function on [0,b] bounded by a maximum h(b,b) to go to the third line.
Hence, the di erence between TF1 and TF2 is inferior to   > 0 when   =  
 h(b,b).  
Proof of proposition 3. All mixed strategies at the equilibrium lead to the same expected utility.
Thus, we can completely characterize the set of equilibrium in mixed strategies. In particular,




(vi   (1   2 i)x)dFj(x)   (1   2 i)xi(1   Fj(xi)) = 0
Hence the Volterra integral equation
fj(x)vi = (1   2 i)(1   Fj(x)) (7)
20A space is relatively compact when his closed span is compact.
20The solution is given by
Fj(x) = 1   kjexp
 
 
(1   2 i)x
vi
 
x   Xj kj   R
Fj is a distribution function deﬁned on Xj where the minima is zero and the maxima noted
˜ x. As the distribution functions must verify Fj(0) = 0,Fj(˜ x) = 1 and
  ˜ x
0
fj(x)dx = 1, we know
that Xj and [0;+ ) are merged but also that kj = 1. Henceforth,
Fj(x) = 1   exp
 
 
(1   2 i)x
vi
 
x   [0;+ )
 
Proof of proposition 4. By (2) we have the expected utility:
EUi(xi,X i) = vi
 
j =i






















      
B
A represents bidder i’s expected payment when we take into account its own external e ect.
The term B is the expected payment of bidder i’s rivals.  iB is the sum of the externalities of
bidder i’s rivals that i takes advantage of.






















      
AII
The term AI is i’s expected payment when she wins i.e. he pays the second highest bid. AII is









xj1 xk xj xi
















































We get the ﬁrst line from the fact that x(2)1xi xj =
 
j =i
xj1 xk xj xi
 k ={j,i},j =i
. The independence of




















= xi(1   Gi(xi))
The independence of the distribution functions, explains how we go from the ﬁrst line to the
second.


































      
BII
 
We add all of the expected external e ects. The case where player l  = i takes the second higher






















































































Fm(xk)1xi xk xldFk(xk)dFl(xl) + xi
 
m =i,l
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Fm(xi)(1   Fl(xi))
 











As the expected utility is constant at the equilibrium, the FOC leads to
viG 
i(x)   (1    i)(1   Gi(x)) +  i
 
l =i
Gil(x)    i
 
l =i





Notice that (n   1)Gi(x) =
 
l =i






(vi    ix(n   2))G 
i(x) + (1    in)Gi(x) = (1    i)    i
 
l =i
Gil(x)  i   {1,...,n} (A1)
This result is true for all n > 3. The closed characterization of the solution is very di cult.
Yet, we can deduce the solution by an alternative way. Indeed, let Fi and Fj be the mixed
strategies of the two bidders i and j. We can notice that the derivative of the expected utility of
a third bidder k Hk(x) =
 EUk
 x (xi,X1,X2) is a monotonous increasing function. Furthermore,
Hk(0) =  (1    k) and limx +  Hk(x) = 0. Thus, given the mixed strategies of i and j, k do
not participate.
This result can easily be extended to a number n of bidders. For that, we should use recurrence.
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